8th TFW Day to Day History
1967

January

One of the primary missions assigned to the Wolf Pack was flying escort mutual pod protection and Iron Hand support for the Republic F-105D Thunderchief equipped Wings co-located in Thailand. Since the F-105 Wings were setting the Strike routes the ingress/egress planning by the 8 TFW was pretty much pre-determined. A typical Strike for the 8 TFW and one F-105 Wing would involve up to 32 aircraft, though typically only 28 aircraft. One Iron Hand flight, four F-105 Strike flights, two F-4 Strike flights, with two F-4 CAP flights (the extra four aircraft). Supporting the F-105 Strike force is what set up the following unique mission.

Operation BOLO

When the maintenance personnel arrived for the 0800-2000 shift on 1 January they were instructed to download everything from all squadron aircraft—missiles, MERs, TERs, and ECM pods, everything. The air-air missiles (AAM) were loaded onto weapons trailers and taken to the missile shops for a complete operational check-up and test. Considering the Weapon Load crews were typically undermanned this was a massive and very labor-intensive job, so much so that the evening shift, 2000-0800 hours, crews were called in early, after which the base was closed and all ‘routine’ flying ceased.

Only those aircraft outfitted with the MAU-12B/A inboard armament pylons were selected for the mission (older aircraft were still outfitted with the LAU-17 pylons). Once an aircraft was selected the maintenance crews then conducted a thorough inspection; those aircraft in for routine Phase inspections were accelerated and sent to the flight line. After an aircraft was checked off as Code 1, the electronic warfare personnel went to work in secrecy, outfitting the QRC-160 ECM pod on Station 2 (for some personnel this would be their first glimpse of the ‘black magic’ pods). After the ECM work was done the missile personnel performed tests on the missile firing circuits. Then came a very unusual, and reportedly to some, a very sobering order, to perform GWM-4 checks on all aircraft. A GWM-4 check was a special weapons systems test, i.e., nuclear weapons. Rumors began to circulate with a life of their own—special weapons tests and secret ECM pods led to speculation that nuclear weapons were to be loaded (‘Big Apples’, ‘Big Bombs’, ‘Nukes’). There were lumps in the throats of personnel—GWM-4 checks scared hell out of the troops. Finally, late at night trailers loaded with AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-7 Sparrow III AAMs began to arrive on the flight line—each aircraft was to receive a maximum load of eight AAMs and three external fuel tanks. Work was non-stop, even chow was brought to the troops on the flight line.

At daybreak on 2 January, some 28-hours of non-stop work by the maintenance and support personnel, the aircrews began to arrive. COL Robin Olds, Wing Commander, 8 TFW, put into action Operation BOLO, whereby fourteen flights of F-4C from the three 8 TFW squadrons at Ubon RTAFB, and elements from the 366 TFW, Da Nang AB, played ‘possum’, mimicking the flight profiles of bomb-laden F-105 Thunderchiefs, including utilizing their radio frequencies and call signs. The goal of this deception was to catch the NVAF MiGs by surprise—instead of vulnerable bomb-laden bombers the MiGs found squadrons of 54 missile-laden F-4C fighters. In addition to the F-4C there were also four flights of F-104 Starfighters, six flights of F-105 Thunderchiefs, more than ten dedicated KC-135 Stratotankers, and electronic warfare support provided by the USAF EB-66 Destroyer and RC-121.

Launching in flights of four at five minute intervals left Ubon RTAFB almost empty with no other flight activity while the operation was underway. When the aircrews returned home they brought with them seven MiG-21 kills by seven different aircrews. The success of the 8 TFW in shooting down MiGs earned them a rare and honored nickname ‘leading MiG parts distributor in Asia,’ bestowed upon them by Bob Hope, entertainer extraordinaire.

COL Olds stated "As one MiG 21 came in, I fired two missiles at him. I saw one hit the MiG’s left side, blowing its wing off….We outflew, outshot and outfought them. The MiG pilots seemed aggressive: quite willing to hassle." MAJ Phillip P. Combies, aircraft commander, scored his MiG kill on his very first mission. "I saw one missile detonate in his tailpipe. There was a large orange explosion and the MiG went down"

One of the unfortunate crews to not score a MiG kill this mission: "We didn’t get any. The first three flights in action shot ‘em all up. There was nothing left when we got there."

Those aircrews scoring individual MiG kills:

Olds Flight – 555 TFS

F-4C 63-7680, Olds 01, COL Robin Olds, pilot/1LT Charles C. Clifton, PSO; AIM-9
F-4C 63-7589, Olds 02, 1LT Ralph F. Wetterhann, pilot/1LT Jerry K. Sharp, PSO; AIM-7
F-4C 63-7683, Olds 04, CAPT Walter S. Radecker, III, pilot/1LT James E. Murray, III, PSO; AIM-9

Ford flight – 555 TFS

F-4C 63-7710,-Ford 02, CAPT Everett T. Raspberry, Jr., pilot/1LT Robert W. Western, PSO; AIM-9

Rambler Flight – 433 TFS

F-4C 64-0720, Rambler 01, CAPT John B. Stone, pilot/1LT Clifton P. Dunnegan, Jr., PSO; AIM-7
F-4C 64-0692, Rambler 02, 1LT Lawrence J. Glynn, Jr., pilot/1LT Lawrence E. Cary, PSO; AIM-7
F-4C 64-0838, Rambler 04, MAJ Phillip P. Combies, pilot/1LT Lee R. Dutton, PSO; AIM-7

The 555 TFS added a pair of MiG-21 kill stars to the Wolfpack tally board on 6 January: CAPT Richard M. Pasco, pilot/1LT Norman E. Wells, PSO, in F-4C 64-0839, and MAJ Thomas M. Hirsch, pilot/1LT Roger J. Strasswinner, PSO, in F-4C 64-0849, each used the AIM-7E Sparrow III to shot down a MiG-21.

The 497 TFS lost F-4C 64-0773 (755 hours), call sign Shark, on 23 January during a 0700-hours CAP mission for a MiG sweep over RP-VIA. They were hit by a SAM enroute to their orbit station—1LT B.B. Bridges and 1LT D.F. Gray, Jr., ejected at 21°-10’N/105°-37’E and were captured.

A number of attrition replacement F-4C were acquired throughout the month. F-4C 63-7572 arrived on 6 January from the 366 TFW via the 6200 MW, Clark AB; 63-7487, 64-0785 and 64-0788 arrived on 9 January from the 33 TFW, Eglin AFB; 63-7659 arrived on 12 January from the 12 TFW via the 6200 MW, Clark AB; 63-7496 arrived on 13 January from the 366 TFW; 63-7650 arrived on 15 January from the 12 TFW; and 63-7586 arrived on 30 January from the 12 TFW.

F-4C 64-0796 was the sole transfer out during January, transferring on 25 January to the Ogden AMA depot at Hill AFB, Utah, from where it was transferred to the 4453 CCTW at Davis Monthan AFB, Utah.

6200 MW, Clark AB

10/1: 63-7448, 63-7634 25/1: 63-7496 (497 TFA)
14/1: 64-0767 27/1: 63-7589 (555 TFS)
17/1: 63-7686 (to Air Asia depot) 27/1: 63-7500, 63-7514
23/1: 64-0731 31/1: 63-7599, 63-7650
F-4C 63-7644 was released from the Ubon-based RAM unit on 10 January.

ROLLING THUNDER 54, 23 February-22 April

The target package for ROLLING THUNDER 54 included many of the long-sought- after industrial targets. Added was the Thai Nguyen iron/steel plant, thermal power plants outside of Hanoi and Haiphong, the huge Hanoi rail yard, SAM support facilities within residual Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuary zones, POL storage facilities and the cement works and selected areas of the port complex in Haiphong, Phuc Yen and Kap Airfields. In at least one work the target lists published included the surrounding locks and dams controlling the waterways Lines of Communication (LOC), however, reportedly the U.S. air forces never purposely targeted the extensive waterways LOC in order to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties in the event of extensive flooding. Of course, knowing the U.S. aircraft would not target the dams and dikes made them logical locations for NVA AAA batteries to set up shop. Weather was usually at its worst in February thus many of the newly authorized targets could not be hit right away due to weather-related cancellations. Many sections of North Vietnam would have been rendered flood plains during the monsoon seasons if these essential locks and dams were damaged or destroyed.

First person recollections

In August 1998 Mark J. Colrad, contributed a couple of his memories of combat operations from the Control Tower at Ubon RTAFB in the January/February time frame:

"I had been assigned at Ubon RTAFB as a Control Tower Operator and had several memorable recollections. I worked the F4C that crashed and burned on the runway at Ubon which killed both pilots and also controlled the sixteen F4’s led by Colonel Robin Olds that shot down several MiG’s in January 1967. It seems to me that we used an area east to southeast of the Base as an eject area that was adjacent to our EOD (emergency ordnance disposal) site. Although we handled many battle damaged aircraft coming home, I don’t recall handling any aircraft that we had to physically ditch in that area other than their ordnance. I also remember an amusing story as relayed tome by a Captain who flew the backseat with Colonel Olds while on a bombing mission to the northwest railroad in North Vietnam. After dropping all of their ordnance at the target site, they spotted a North Vietnamese road crew repairing a road and Colonel Olds dove on them with his F-4C. Since their ordnance was gone, Colonel Olds dropped white phosphorous flares on a grade-all to disrupt their efforts! I also recall Colonel Daniel ‘Chappie’ James telling me that the F4C was built around him and for him! He (James) was quite a large and imposing person and I often wondered how he ever got into the cockpit and was able to fly that chick like he did."

A number of attrition replacement F-4C were acquired throughout the month. The 33 TFW transferred on 12 February 63-7432 and 63-7441. On 21 February 64-0695 was transferred to the 12 TFW while taking in 63-7653 from the 479 TFW, George AFB, California. A pair of aircraft were received on 27 February: the 479 TFW transferred 63-7663 while the 15 TFW, MacDill AFB, Florida, transferred 63-7671. F-4C 63-7564 was transferred on 6 February to the Ogden AMA depot from where it went to the 4453 CCTW in January 1968.

6200 MW, Clark AB

3/2-: 63-7659; -3/2: 63-7496; 10/2-: 63-7680 (497 TFS, -by 27/2); -12/2: 63-7629; 14-17/2: 63-7667; 17-21/2: 63-7538; 25/2-: 64-0739; 27/2-: 63-7487. 64-0699;

Air Asia Depot

-4/2: 64-0720; -pre 8/2: 63-7683; 5/2-: 63-7559 (-3/6: 41 AD): 10/2-: 63-7650; -18/2: 63-7686; 28/2-: 63-7496

March

On 3 March the 497 TFS lost F-4C 63-7656 (1,066 hours), call sign Coach, on a 2000-hours Strike mission targeting boats along the coast of RP-I. The aircraft was hit by unknown gunfire during the dive to the second pass at the target (17°-45’N/106°-24’E) and crashing in the target area (pilot possibly hit). MAJ Floyd W. Richardson and LCOL Charles D. Roby were killed, their remains were repatriated on 15 December 1988.

PARDO’S PUSH

On 10 March the Thai Nguyen iron/steel works (JCS Target No. 76), located 35-mi/56-km north of Hanoi, was targeted for the first time. This was one of the most important industrial targets in North Vietnam. The egress from this strike produced a most unique F-4 story, historically dubbed '‘Pardo's Push.

Cheetah Flight, consisting of four F-4C from the 433 TFS was part of the coordinated strike on the plant. CAPT Earl D. Aman, pilot/CAPT Robert W. Houghton, WSO, in F-4C 63-7653 (504 hours ) call sign Cheetah Four, was hit by AAA (21°-58’N/105°-22’E) while enroute to the target and then again when rolling in on the target, causing several fuel leaks. Cheetah Two, with CAPT John Pardo, pilot/1LT Stephan A. Wayne, WSO, in F-4C 64-0839 (MiG-21. 6 January 1967) at the controls was also hit by AAA (21°-33’N/105°-52’E) in the belly area, likewise resulting in fuel leaks. During the egress CAPT Aman was in desperate need of an aerial refueling but no tankers were available so deep in enemy territory. Though both aircraft had fuel leaks, CAPT Aman’s aircraft was by far the more critical—one engine flamed out. Now the concern was a matter of ‘when’ to eject, not ‘if’ to eject. CAPT Pardo probably could have made it to a tanker but that was not an option he considered, "How can you fly off and leave someone you just fought a battle with?" CAPT Pardo, recognizing that they were still over ‘MIA Country’ (RP-V), decided to give CAPT Aman’s aircraft a ‘push’.

The ‘push’ was a complicated ballet that started with CAPT Aman deploying his drag chute, opening up an area that might have allowed the nose of 64-0839 up against the tail section of 63-7653, however, the turbulence prevented this initial plan. Time ran out when CAPT Aman’s second engine flamed out—he was now descending into the Laotian jungle at some 250-knots. CAPT Pardo told CAPT Aman to lower his tailhook—tailhook down CAPT Pardo nursed his aircraft up against the boot of the hook, placing the boot against the center flat windscreen of the front windshield—two feet from CAPT Pardo’s face. The turbulence was so bad that this ‘push’ position could be maintained for about thirty seconds at a time. Then the aircraft briefly separated and rejoined. CAPT Pardo then began to worry when spiderweb cracks began forming in the glass windscreen; he then shifted the focus of the book down lower to a stronger section of the front windscreen metal framework. This process worked well enough to move them westward some 80-mi/129-km to within range of the USAF CSAR helicopters. CAPT Aman and CAPT Houghton were first to eject (19°-45’N/103°-44’E), followed shortly thereafter by CAPT Pardo and 1LT Wayne, when their engines finally flamed out (19°-41’N/103°-44’E). On the ground CAPT Aman and CAPT Houghton managed to elude the enemy forces pursuing them. All four aircrewmen were picked up by helicopter.

To many CAPT Pardo was an instant hero, among those not saluting his bravery were the bean-counters (accountants). For a while there was the threat of charges being filed against him for losing his expensive aircraft. Not until some two decades later did CAPT Pardo (then a retired LCOL) and 1LT Wayne receive the official recognition for their actions, finally being presented with the Silver Star.

The 433 TFS lost F-4C 64-0788 (473 hours) over Thai territory on 21 March after being involved in a mid-air collision with F-4C 63-7586.

On 26 March the 433 TFS lost F-4C 64-0849 (MiG-21, 6 January 1967), call sign Nelson, on a 1500-hours Strike mission against the Son Tay Army Supply area, RP-V. The aircraft was hit by a SAM in the left wind when pulling up at the target (20°-55’N/105°-15’E); LCOL Fred A. Crow, Jr., and 1LT H.P. Fowler, Jr., ejected at 20°-56’N/104°-56’E and were captured.

Ordnance Disposal

The USAF procedure for disposing of ordnance not dropped over the primary target was to dispose of it over a secondary target of choice. With the ‘hot secret war’ in Laos, the Thailand-based F-4 units would answer Laos-based FAC calls for ordnance drops enroute home. Unfortunately, there were cases of indiscriminate drops over Laos and the border regions.

Mission Type

The 497 TFS ‘Night Owls’ were the only fighter squadron in Southeast Asia to fly combat missions exclusively at night. Using aircraft painted black on the bottoms, missions were flown at night using whatever cloud cover may be available to conceal them from the AAA gunner. There are photos from the area showing aircraft painted entirely black (not even national markings), with at least one of these aircraft wearing a very large and colorful ‘sharks mouth’ paint job on the nose. Operating in pairs the lead aircraft was typically laden with flares and a bomb load, aka a ‘Pathfinder’ and the ‘Hunter’ wingman, carrying a full ordnance load, head out on missions primarily against the LOCs.

In the March 1967 issue of Phantom NEWSLETTER, Capt. Thomas C. Wilkinson, ‘Hunter’ pilot, provided a description of a typical mission: (with LT James M. Chapman, WSO) "When the Phantoms reach the target, the pilots, using instruments, descend through the thick cloud deck, ‘goin’ in for look-see.’….Now the pilots, using the newest and most advanced electronic equipment, revert back to tactics of the old ‘hunter and hunted’ adage for stalking their prey, seeking it out and destroying it."

"The Pathfinder makes his break first over the suspected target, swooping down to release his flares which will bring the blackness to brilliant daylight. Following the Pathfinder’s pass, the Hunter comes in for a look. The Hunter makes his check of the target area for troop movements, truck convoys, or anything considered a military target." On this particular mission the team found a number of trucks, aka, ‘truck park,’ trying to conceal themselves in the shadows of the dense jungle foliage. "Finding what he’s looking for, CAPT Wilkinson rolls off and Pathfinder again comes in and lights up the area. The Hunter makes its final pass and releases the ordnance. Pulling off, both aircraft watch for the after effect which comes seconds after. "I see five primaries (explosions)," radios Pathfinder. "Rog" call CAPT Wilkinson, "there’s a couple secondaries now." Pathfinder waits and watches. If anything is left or he sees another military target, he’ll destroy it."

Not mentioned in the article or mission description is the effect of the ignition of the flares on the night vision of the aircrews. With their night vision severely degraded by the illumination of the flares the mission for that night was most likely over with.

Another CBD Story

Proof of the Phantom’s durability stemmed from many Combat Battle Damage (CBD) stories. One such story was included in the June and September 1967 issues of Phantom NEWSLETTER had to do with a flight by LT Ralph F. Wetterhann, pilot/LT Jerry K. Sharp, WSO, 555 TFS, a veteran of the Operation BOLO MiG-fest on 2 January. A flight of three F-4C was on a seek and destroy mission 20-mi/32-km northwest of Hanoi, flying at an altitude of only 200-ft/61km on approach to the target, an oil storage depot. This low altitude put them within the reach of the AAA and as fate would have it, short of the target they were raked by .50 caliber automatic weapon fire, hitting them in the aft section. Continuing on to the target they took a hit by 57-mm in the right intake area, ripping a 2-ft x 4-ft (.61-m x 2-m) section from the cowling over the right engine. "As we arrived over the oil depot, I turned the afterburner on to get into bombing position and when I did, the right engine burst into flames, but we delivered our ordnance on target."

Off the target, he reduced power on the damaged engine and the other engine forced them to a low altitude egress through heavy AAA. They managed one air-air refueling from a KC-135 tanker, taking on enough fuel to get them back over friendly territory. At home place they used the barrier to catch them, for a safe landing. For this mission CAPT Wetterhann was presented the Silver Star for conspicuous gallantry, presented by MGEN Charles R. Bond, Jr., Commander, Twelfth Air Force, in a stateside ceremony.

4/3: 64-0739 16-27/3: 63-7668

6-19/3: 64-0788 22-28/3: 63-7644

8/3: 63-7589 ??-23/3: 64-0785

10-19/3: 63-7586 24-28/3: 63-7442

12/3: 63-7572 (-15/11: 41 AD)

F-4C 63-7650 returned from the Air Asia depot on 19 March. Three aircraft were involved in visits to the Ubon-based RAM unit: 63-7556 was released on 3 March; 63-7645 was released on 12 March; and 63-7647 was released on 30 March.

April

The 15 TFW, MacDill AFB, Florida, transferred in a number of aircraft during April: 63-7413 on 14 April; 63-7594 on 17 April; 63-7582 and 63-7639 on 24 April; and 63-7692 on 29 April. Tow ex-479 TFW aircraft were transferred in via the Ogden AMA depot: 63-7658 on 4 April and 63-7669 on 16 April.

On 28 April the 433 TFS lost F-4C 63-0720 (1,061 hours; MiG-21, 2 January 1967) to a freak take-off accident. The ordnance exploded during the take-off roll; a McAir document lists a suspected engine failure ruptured a fuel cell. MAJ V. Christinsen and CAPT Bodanl successfully egressed from this flaming aircraft.

• 3/4: 63-7487
• 4-24/4: 63-7641 (s. 24/4 with 1,009 hours)
• 26/4-: 63-7552
• F-4C 63-7668 was deployed at the 6200 MW facility when transferred on 22 April to the 366 TFW.

May

F-4C 64-0708 was released on 1 May from the RAM unit.

ROLLING THUNDER 56, 2 May – 19 July

Ten fixed targets were added to the authorized list for ROLLING THUNDER 56. The main emphasis was still on the transportation links, especially the effort to sever the rail link between Hanoi and China.

On 4 May COL Robin Olds, pilot/1LT William D. Lafever, WSO, in F-4C 63-7668. 555 TFS, used the AIM-9B Sidewinder to shoot down his second MiG (MiG-21) of the Vietnam War.

The 433 TFS lost F-4C 63-7652 (1,037 hours) on 9 May when the left mainmount tire blew on take-off, causing the left wing tank to ignite and fire spread to the rest of the aircraft. MAJ R.B. Wettington and LT L.W. Crane (third degree burns) were recovered. (Ground egress.)

Five MiG-17 fell to the 8 TFW Wolfpack and 366 TFW Gunfighters on 13 and 14 May. Seven MiG-17s fell to three Thailand-based wings on 13 May: two kills were scored by the 433 TFS with LCOL Fred. A. Haeffner, pilot/1LT Michael R. Bever, WSO, in F-4C 63-7680, using the AIM-7E Sparrow III; MAJ William L. Kirk, pilot/1LT Steven A. Wayne, WSO, in F-4C 64-0739, used the AIM-9B Sidewinder to score their kills.

Gun Pods

There is likely a good bit of inter-service rivalry over which service was first to introduce the gun pods in combat-the USMC or USAF. The first USAF unit to introduce the SUU-16/A 20-mm gun pod in Southeast Asia was the 366 TFW. There are various references to the 366 TFW being among the very first tactical air units to take delivery of the SUU-16/A gun pod with the General Electric M61A1 20-mm Vulcan Gatling gun (cannon) in the April time frame. Frederick C. ‘Boots’ Blesse, MGEN, USAF Ret., wrote about the introduction of the gun pod in his book CHECK SIX, (Ivy Books, 1987).

A long-time advocate of guns on fighters, then-COL Blesse, MiG ace from the Korean War (using guns) was the new Director of Operations, 366 TFW and set about a plan to introduce the cannon into the air-air mission. This was crucial timing in that the 366 TFW, previously assigned the air-ground mission was newly tasked (along with the 8 TFW) to fly Escort for F-105 Thunderchiefs. COL Blesse set up a weapons section to run tests to determine if the SUU-16 gun pod would work in an air-air environment. Among those aircrewmen instrumental in the test and evaluation phase were: LCOL Fred Haeffner (433 TFS), MAJ Jerry Robbinette, MAJ Ed Lipsey, MAJ Bob Dilger, MAJ Samuel O. Bakke, CAPT Bob Novak, CAPT Skip Cox, CAPT Jim Craig, and others doing the early experimenting with the gun. These men also participated in a variety of other weapon-related problems, such as munitions loads, barrier procedures, chaff drops, drag chute procedure, ECM, bombing procedures and air-air procedures.

COL Blesse needed the permission of GEN Momyer, Seventh Air Force, before they could take the gun up North. The 366 TFW weapons cadre began a series of tests to develop procedures and collect performance data. They flew tow F-4C together, one with the SUU-16 gun pod in the centerline position and one without, confirming that the fuel to carry the pod was not excessive, especially if they let only the leaders carry the pod. Once they proved the idea was feasible they had another hurdle-there was no computing gunsight in the F-4C-they had to make do with the fixed gun sight (and grease pencils for marking the canopy). The cannon was so powerful that the rounds impacted on a MiG only about 8-in/20-cm apart at the 2,000-ft/610-m range. The procedure they worked with was to put the fixed sight pipper on the target, then moved it forward about twice as far as one thought necessary before firing, this set up overleading the target. The pilot would begin firing, gradually decreasing the amount of lead, allowing the enemy aircraft to fly through the very concentrated burst of 2—mm.

The 366 TFW began testing the gun pod for not only air-air use but air-ground work as well. Testing was done with two guns on the outboard wing stations for the CAS/DAS missions. For really heavy duty, close to home base work, three guns-two outboard and one on the centerline were loaded. With the initial test data in hand it was time for the 366 TFW to brief GEN Momyer on the value of the gun pods. At the appointed hour it just so happened that COL Robin Olds, 8 TFW Commander, was in a meeting with GEN Momyer and was invited to sit in on the gun pod briefing by COL Blesse. COL Olds definitely did not like the idea. GEN Momyer was more polite about his lack of interest but gave the go-ahead, asking COL Blesse to keep him posted on developments. Around the first week of May MAJ Bob Dilger and COL Blesse flew the first gun-equipped F-4s into RP-VI, on an Escort mission. On 14 May all of the testing paid off—three MiGs were shot down by the 480 TFS/366 TFW on a single mission-two by gun!

20 May

Hanoi citizenry awakened to the sound of airstrikes on military targets on the ground and dogfights overhead on 20 May. Targets on the ground included the thermal power plant located about 1-mi/1.6-km north of Hanoi center. (During the month CTF-77 also struck the power plants at Uong Bi and Bac Giang, located about 15.5-mi/25-km northwest of Hanoi.)

In the air six MiGs fell under AAMs from the 366 TFW and 8 TFW, flying CAP for the F-105 Thunderchief strikes. The 433 TFS, flying escort for the 1500-hour F-105 strike aircraft, added four MiG-17 Fresco kills to their tally board. Altogether eight F-4C tangled with fifteen MiG-17 in an aerial battle that lasted for eleven minutes-a very long battle in the modern jet age. The dogfighting spanned the altitude from a low of 100-ft/31-m, to a high of only 8,500-ft/2,591-m. MAJ John R. Pardo, pilot/1LT Stephen A. Wayne, WSO (Prado’s Push, March; MiG-17, 13 May) in F-4C 63-7623, call sign Tampa 03, engaged the first MiG-17 to attack the flight, firing a AIM-9B Sidewinder that impacted in the tail section of their intended target. The MiG-17 began spewing debris. The aircrew spotted the aircraft burning on the ground after they had executed a 360° turn in an effort to engage another MiG-17. Within seconds of this first shoot down CAPT Ron Catton screamed for Pardo to break left to avoid more MiGs entering the area.

The ensuing dogfight twisted down into a shallow valley where the MiGs formed into a counter-clockwise Luftbery circle, aka ‘wheel in the middle of the air,’ which was very difficult to penetrate. MAJ Phillip P. Combies (MiG-21, 2 January), pilot/1LT Daniel L. Laffarty, WSO, in F-4C 64-0673, call sign Ballot 01, fired a AIM-9B Sidewinder that impacted near the tail pipe of a MiG-17, resulting in the aircraft going belly up and then straight down in an uncontrollable dive.

COL Robin Olds, 8 TFW Commander, pilot/1LT Steven B. Croker, WSO, in F-4C 64-0829, call sign Tampa 01, (433 TFS) fired an AIM-7E Sparrow III at a MiG-17-the aircraft caught fire, veered off to the left and crashed into the ground. Seconds later, now down to 100/ft/31-m, chasing a MiG-17 trying to escape by hugging the ground, they fired an AIM-9B Sidewinder at the MiG-17 just as it was going over a ridge line, hitting the aircraft on the right side of the fuselage. As COL Olds described the fight: "We had a hellava battle,…It was one of the greatest I’ve ever been in. It was like World War II up there-wall-to-wall Migs." (Phantom NEWSLETTER, Vol 2, No. 4, June 1967)

With these confirmed MiG kills COL Olds was now the leading MiG killer with four. Though he never did reach the fifth confirmed MiG kill to earn Vietnam ace status, he holds the distinction of being the only U.S. aerial ace with victories almost a quarter of a century apart. Twelve victories from World War II and four MiG kills over Vietnam. Proof enough that experience still had an edge over youth on occasion. Robin Olds went on to be involved in the USAF fighter dissimilar tactics program and eventually retired as a Brigadier General (BGEN).

Not all was one sided during this battle as the 433 TFS lost one F-4C to a MiG gun. MAJ Jack L. VanLoan, pilot/1LT Joseph E. Milligan, WSO, in F-4C 63-7669 (777 hours), call sign Tampa, was hit in the wing at 21°-25’N/106°-25’E and ejected at 106°-65’E. This aircrew sat out the rest of the war as POWs.

22 May

Across the theater the 497 TFS lost two F-4C on Strike missions over North Vietnam where both were hit by heavy 37/57-mm AAA, F-4C 63-7692, call sign Twirps, was on a 2000-hours mission when hit enroute (21°-35’N/106°-31’E) to their intended target area, Kep Railroad yard. The aircrew ejected at 21°-12’N/107°-13’E; MAJ R.D. Vogel was captured, 1LT D.L. Baldwin was retrieved by a USN helicopter. The second loss involved F-4C 64-0708, call sign Whizzer, on a 1900-hours Strike mission against the Cao Nung Railroad Yard, RP-VIB. The aircraft was hit by AAA while enroute (21°-33’N/106°-30’E), pilot possibly hit, crashing at 106°-29’E. CAPT Elton L. Perrine and 1LT Kenneth F. Backus were listed as MIA. The wingman observed the aircraft make a bomb run on the target followed five seconds later by a large explosion 3-mi/4.8-km east of the target, in the Lang Son Province. There were no parachutes or beacon signals. On 24 May the New China News Agency reported the downing of a U.S. aircraft over Lang Son Province on 22 May and stated that the aircrewmen were captured. F-4C 64-0708 was the only aircraft lost in the area on this date. Returning U.S. POWs were unable to provide any information on the aircrew’s fate. In February the status was changed from MIA to Presumed dead/body not recovered.

By the end of May there had been 72 aerial engagements with NVAF MiGs, resulting in the 8 TFW adding seven red stars to their tally board, while losing one F-4C to MiGs.

F-4D Arrives In-Theater

In May the ‘Fightin’ Fortieth’ 40 TFS/33 TFW, Eglin AFB, Florida, began preparing for the transpac of a squadron of new F-4D assets to the 555 TFS/8 TFW, at Ubon RTAFB. Prior to the actual deployment of aircraft the 33 TFW forward deployed detachments of maintenance personnel to Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and Anderson AFB, Guam, to provide any necessary enroute maintenance.

The actual deployment (26-28 May) of the aircraft was a three-part deployment, led by LCOL Wesley D. Kimball, Squadron Commander. The first leg was a non-stop hop to Hickam AFB and then on to Guam and ultimately Thailand with numerous in-flight refuelings enroute. The entire complement of aircraft completed the deployment without accident, incident or abort. The transfer was completed effective 26 May. The biggest improvement over the F-4C was the F-4D had better radar range and air-ground ordnance delivery capability. Included in the new armament capabilities was the delivery of the USN-developed/Martin Mariatta-produced AGM-62A WALLEYE I PGM with radio command guidance and a gyro-stabilized television camera in the seeker head; SUU-16/A 20-mm centerline gun pods. These aircraft were modified under the COMBAT EAGLE program to carry this first generation PGM. (Fifty percent of the initial AGM-62A delivered to the theater malfunctioned which in turn triggered a USAF investigation of the Martin Marietta Quality Control and production line test procedures.) The F-4D was equipped with the internal Bendix AN/APS-107A Radar Homing And Warning (RHAW) ECM set: the initial production run aircraft were equipped with the QRC-325 set which had not been debugged prior to the combat

Debut and consequently had less than ideal performance (corrections were being performed in-house as a high priority logistics project). The corrections were incorporated in the APS-107A on the production line.

Aircraft deployed:

65-0722. 65-0724, 65-0727, 66-0236, 66-0238, 66-0239, 66-0241, 66-0243, 66-0245, 66-0247, 66-0248, 66-0249, 66-0250, 66-0263, 66-0274

There was a mini-swapfest between the 8 TFW and the 12 TFW throughout May. Aircraft transferred to the 12 TFW at Cam Rahn Bay AB: 63-7442 on 13 May; 63-7500 and 63-7514 on 20 May; 63-7448 and 63-7499 on 23 May. Aircraft received from the 12 TFW: 63-7612 and 64-0673 on 19 May; 64-0704 on 20 May; 63-7580 and 64-0724 on 22 May. Three aircraft were acquired on 31 May: 63-7668 arrived from the 366 TFW; two aircraft were acquired from the Ogden AMA depot; 63-7684 (ex-15 TFW) and 63-7708 (ex-479 TFW).

6200 MW. Clark AB

1-9/5: 63-7432 19/5-: 63-7645

4/5-: 63-7441 22/5-: 64-0673

9/5: 63-7692 24/5-: 64-0724

11/5-: 64-0779 (? Return) 28/5-: 64-0704

14/5: 63-7552

F-4C 63-7693, ex-479 TFW, was acquired on 30 May via the 6200 MW facility.
F-4C 63-7710 returned from the Air Asia depot on 5 May.

June

On 5 June the F-4D scored its first MiG kill; the F-4C added two more MiG-17 kills (one for the 8 TFW). MAJ Everett T. Raspberry, Jr., pilot (MiG-21, 2 January 1967)/CAPT Francis M. Gullick, WSO, in F-4D 66-0249, call sign Drill 01, from the 555 TFS, knocked down a MiG-17 via the AIM-7E Sparrow III. MAJ Raspberry’s mastery of the USAF F-4 did not go without noticed from higher up as soon hereafter he was reassigned as the F-4E Wing Project Officer, 4525 Fighter Weapon Wing, Nellis AFB, Nevada. He would become the pilot of the first F-4E, 66-0284, accepted by USAF on 2 October 1967. CAPT Richard M. Pascoe, pilot/CAPT Norman E. Wells, WSO, in F-4C 63-7647, 555 TFS, used the AIM-9B Sidewinder/SUU-23A gun pod combination to down a MiG-17.

Four additional F-4D were transferred from the 40 TFS/33 TFW to the 555 TFS during the first half of the month: 66-0246 and 66-0260 on 8 June; 65-0723 and 65-0726 on 13 June. This completed the deliveries for the first 20-aircraft F-4D squadron in Southeast Asia. On 10 June the 555 TFS lost their first F-4D, though not to a combat cause. F-4D 66-0236 (160 hours) was on a CAP mission when the internal fuel transferred to the wing tanks, causing the engines to flame out. MAJ C.H. Allen and LT B. Becker ejected over Thailand and were recovered.

USAF and USN air forces pulled off a large, well coordinated strike on NVAF airfields on 11 June. USAF hit the Hoa Lac Airfield while USN aircraft (including VF-142/VF-143, CVA-64) hit the Kep Airfield, both located in RP-VIA. Post-strike reconnaissance (another way of describing Bomb Damage Assessment, BDA) revealed that 26 MiGs were destroyed on the ground—representing roughly one quarter of the NVAF MiG force. Combined with the 15 aerial MiG kills in May the NVAF had lost at least 41 aircraft in just six weeks. Shortly thereafter the surviving NVAF MiG force once again fled to sanctuary bases in southern China to reequip, train, and generally just recover.

On 12 June the 555 TFS, though officially equipped with the F-4D, the Wing was still able to draw from the F-4C pool. The squadron lost F-4C 63-7673, call sign Rebel, during a 1700-hours Armed Reconnaissance mission over Purple Route, RP-I, North Vietnam when hit in the right wing by 57-mm AAA (probable) while enroute (17°-38’N/106°-25’E). MAJ D.D. Fulcham and CAPT W.K. Harding made it feet wet before ejecting at 16°-03’N/108°-20’E and wet pick-up by helicopter. The squadron lost a second F-4C, 63-7710 (920 hours; MiG-21, 2 January 1967), shortly after take-off when the hydraulics lights came on followed by the loss of PCI/PCII. The aircraft pitched up, signaling CAPT M.G. Slapkias and LT. T.E. Bongartz that it was time to eject (over Thailand.)

In turn a number of F-4C were transferred to other units in and out of the theater. The 12 TWF, Cam Rahn Bay AB, South Vietnam, received: 64-0731 on 3 June; 63-7496 and 64-0739 on 4 June; 63-7522 and 64-0735 on 6 June; and 64-0699 on 10 June. The 366 TFW, Da Nang AB, South Vietnam, received: 63-7538 on 4 June; 63-7647 and 63-7659 on 26 June; 63-7639 was transferred to and returned from the 366 TFW on 27 June. F-4C 63-7629 and 63-7634 were transferred on 5 June to the 41 Air Division in Japan; 63-7629 returned to the 8 TFW on or about 19 June. F-4C 63-7601 was received on/about 11 June from the 15 TFW.

-4/6: 63-7645 -10/6: 63-7441, 64-0704

-5/6: 64-0673 13/6-: 63-7524

-8/6: 64-0724 17/6-: 63-7556

8-22/6: 63-7580 -28/6: 63-7686 (Clark AB)

8/6-1/7: 63-7612

F-4C 63-7650 was transferred on 7 July to the Navy’s depot at NAS Atsugi, Japan and forward transferred on 1 November to the 41 AD. F-4C 63-7487 was transferred on 17 July to the Ogden AMA depot at Hill AFB, Utah, then transferred from there to the 4453 CCTW on 3 May 1968.

Two F-4C were transferred to the 366 TFW: 63-7667 on 9 July and 63-7639 on 12 July.
F-4C 64-0770 deployed to the Air Asia depot on 12 July (Unidentified return date).

The 555 TFS lost their second F-4D, first to a combat cause, on 18 July. F-4D 66-0248, call sign Falcon, left the factory on 18 January, accumulated all of 160 flight hours when hit at 17°-53’N/105°-49’E by 37-mm AAA (possible) during the 0800-hours Armed Reconnaissance mission bomb run over RP-I, North Vietnam. CAPT R.R. Headley and 1LT G.A. Kuenner ejected at 17°-48’N/105°-49’E and rode home aboard a USAF helicopter.

ROLLING THUNDER 57, 20 JULY 1967 – 1 JUNE 1968

Bowing to political maneuvering on 20 July President Johnson made the first of several changes in ‘his’ air war: added sixteen targets within the restricted circles around Hanoi and Haiphong, including at least one previously off-limits NVAF airfield, a rail yard, two bridges, and twelve barracks and supply areas.

Effective 25 July the 435 TFS/8 TFW completed the conversion from the Lockheed F-104C Starfighter to the F-4D. The conversion was accomplished with the delivery of a full squadron of aircraft and aircrews from the 4 TFS/33 TFW, arriving from Eglin AFB, Florida. F-4D 66-7506, 66-7515, 66-7516, 66-7517, 66-7521, 66-7526, 66-7528, 66-7533, 66-7534, 66-7555, 66-7564, 66-7569, 66-7581, 66-7590, 66-7594, 66-7601, 66-7624, 66-7628, 66-7630, 66-7643.

On 26 July the 433 TFS lost F-4C 64-0848, call sign Buick, on a 2100-hours Armed Reconnaissance mission. During the second rocket firing pass on a convoy of 6-10 trucks at 17°-54’N/105°-49’E the F-4C was damaged by their own ordnance. The aircraft failed to pull out of the dive, killing CAPT Richard A. Claflin and 1 LT R. Brazik.

6200 MW, Clark AB

-5/7: 63-7524 (6200 MW), 63-7601 (Clark AB)

-13/7: 63-7556 (6200 MW)

-31/7: 63-7589 (Clark AB)

F-4C 63-7683 returned on 3 August from Clark AB.

Four late deliveries to the 435 TFS involved 66-7513, 66-7523, 66-7565 arriving on 13 August; 66-7631 arrived on 30 August.

F-4C 63-7553 was transferred on 17 August to the Ogden AMA depot then on to the 4453 CCTW on 8 February 1968.

Back on 20 July President Johnson had announced the addition of sixteen fixed targets to the allowable target portfolio: six of the targets were located inside the 10-mi/16-km sanctuary circle around Hanoi, including the long-sought-after Paul Doumer Bridge; nine targets were located inside the PRC buffer zone (as close as 8-mi/13-km to the PRC border); the sixteenth target was a naval base within the PRC buffer zone. Raids on these new targets began almost immediately, followed shortly thereafter with the addition of even more targets—20 new targets were added during the month of August. The Armed Reconnaissance mission profile was expanded

11 August

On 11 August USAF launched a major 36-aircraft Strike package against the Paul Doumer Bridge. This bridge consisted of 19 spans crossing the Red River as it flowed through downtown Hanoi. Altogether the bridge was 5,532-ft/1,686-m long by 38-ft/11.6-m wide, allowing for a 10-ft/3-m wide roadway on both sides of the center rail line. As a major transportation link, averaging 26 PRC-originating trains crossing per day—estimated equivalent of 5,000-tons of supplies arriving unimpeded per day, the military had long sought to take out this lucrative target. The main strike package consisted of four F-105F Wild Weasels from the 388 TFW and four Flak Suppressor F-4D from the 8 TFW, leading the strike force of some 20+ F-105D from the 355 TFW, Ta Khll RTAFB and 388 TFW, Korat RTAFB. The 8 TFW added additional F-4D flights for the CAP and more Flak Suppression. One span of the rail line and two spans of the road section were dropped by 3,000-lb/1,361-kg bombs. Repair work began almost immediately. The North Vietnamese had planned for the eventuality that this bridge would be hit and had contingency bridges set up within a short period of time.

Heavy Attrition

From the government Incident Case Files:

"Other members of their flight reported seeing three parachutes from the crewmen of the two downed aircraft. Three clear beepers were heard as well as one weak beeper which was believed to be associated with Lieutenant Lane. Captain Corrigan was the only individual shot down who was able to establish voice contact with those overhead.

Upon his release, Captain Corrigan reported seeing another individual moving around in his parachute, and he believe that individual to be Lieutenant Lane. Ha Hoi press reported the aircraft downing but did not specify the number of crewmen captured. In August 1968, U.S. Intelligence believed Lieutenant Lane had been captured alive and that he was in enemy custody, although his casualty status remained missing in action.

In October 1973, Lieutenant Lane’s case was reviewed by the Department of Defense at the request of his next of kin, and his casualty status was changed to dead/body not recovered. Captain Sittner’s case was reviewed at a later date, and he was also determined to be dead/body not recovered. Returning U.S. POWs were unable to confirm either individual alive in captivity in the northern Vietnamese prison system.

In November 1991, the Joint Task Force interviewed witnesses to the downing of the two F-4 aircraft and the reported sighting of either 3 or 4 parachutes. The location of their downing was determined to be in Tuyen Quang Province, not in Thai Nguyen Province. Witnesses reported the capture of two airmen and stated that they were unable to locate the other two crewmen until 1970 when the partial remains of one of the two was located. Local witnesses also stated that a nearby People’s Republic of China military unit arrived at one of the crash sites and recovered the wreckage of one of the downed aircraft. They provided no other details about the incident. The Joint Task Force concluded that the reported partial remains may have correlated to the remains of Lieutenant Lane, who was not confirmed to have ejected from his aircraft but could have done so.

In April 1992, a U.S. team interviewed additional witnesses and recovered personal artifacts from both grave sites that did not correlate to the two airmen."

MAJ C.B. Damarque and 1LT J.M. Piet, in F-4D 66-0260 (314 hours), reverted to a SARCAP for the downed squadronmates before low fuel forced them to search for the nearest "Flying Texaco" tanker –they were not so lucky. At 1650-hours—an hour and a half after the shoot downs—this aircrew was forced to eject over friendly Thai territory (17°-29’N/103°-43’E).

The fourth loss involved MAJ R.R. Sawnill, Jr., and 1LT G.L. Geradt, in F-4D 65-0726 (300 hours), falling at 1519-hours to a heavy barrage of AAA, crashing at 21°-04’N/105°-55’E. This aircrew was captured and sat out the rest of the war as POWs.

F-4C 63-7413 deployed to Clark AB on 24 August, replacing 64-0704 returning from the 6200 MW the same day. F-4C 63-7658 deployed on 29 August to Clark AB, being temporarily attached to the 6400 TS (COMBAT SAGE).

F-4D 65-0725 is the first F-4D listed as being inducted (4 September) into the SMAMAM Ubon detachment, remaining there through 1 October.

On 4 September the 555 TFS lost F-4D 65-0723 (371 hours), call sign Tide, on a 0100-hours ROLLING THUNDER 57 Armed Reconnaissance mission targeting suspected trucks at 17°-13’N/106°-45’E, RP-I. Hit by unknown gunfire during a rocket run the aircraft did not pull out of the dive, killing MAJ Carl D. Miller and 1LT T.P. Hanson.

F-4C 63-7629 made a COMBAT SAGE deployment to Clark AB, 6-10 September.

On 9 September the 435 TFS lost F-4D 66-7516 (172 hours) following a combat mission. Ten minutes after leaving the target the fuel low-level light illuminated followed shortly thereafter by a double flame-out—all of this in spite of the fuel quantity readings never dropped below 4,800-lbs. The aircrew (probably LT J. Silliman ad MAJ Ivan D. Appleby) ejected over Thailand and was safely recovered.

On 19 September the 435 TFS/8 TFW lost F-4D 66-7533 (155 hours), call sign Spitfire, on a 0700-hours ROLLING THUNDER Strike on the Thang Quant Railroad siding in RP-VIA. During the egress from the strike the aircraft was hit in the right wing by 57-mm AAA (probable) at 21°-24’N/105°-47’E. During the effort to make it to safe territory the hydraulic pressure was bleeding off until the aircrew was forced to eject over Thailand at 16°-42’N/102°-43’E. MAJ L. Boothby was safely recovered by USAF helicopter. 1LT George H. McKinney, Jr., did not survive the ejection.

On 26 September the 435 TFS lost F-4D 66-7534 (251 hours) on a Strike mission when the loss of electrical power forced the crew (probably CAPT D.J. Ackenny and LT J.D. Mynar) to eject and were recovered.

Already suffering a heavy F-4D attrition rate the 8 TFW took in nine F-4D attrition replacements from the 33 TFW and the factory. The 33 TFW transferred 66-7562 and 66-7661 on 19 September; 66-7546 and 66-7554 on 22 September. From the St. Louis factory: 66-7748, 66-7760, 66-7764 and 66-7772 on 27 September; 66-7752 on 28 September.

F-4C 63-7708 returned from Clark AB on 24 September.

October

F-4D 66-7628 was temporarily ‘visiting’ the OOAAR logistics unit at Udorn RTAFB, 3-15 October, before returning on 31 October to Ubon RTAFB. F-4D 66-0239 was inducted into the SMAMA Ubon logistics unit on 8 October. Three F-4C were visiting at Clark AB during October: 63-7524 was at the air base on and about 3 October; 63-7432 was attending the 6400 TS COMBAT SAGE program 15-31 October; 63-7658 returned from the 6400 TS program on 31 October.

With the 433 TFS scheduled to transition to the F-4D later in the month a number of F-4C were transferred out. Four aircraft went to the 39 AD, Yokota AB: 63-7589, 63-7623, 63-7629, and 63-7644. At least nine F-4C went to the 366 TFW: 63-7671 on 3 October; 63-7668 on 4 October; 63-7680, 63-7683, 63-7686, 64-0673, and 64-0767 on 13 October; 64-0770 and 64-785 on 24 October.

The 8 TFW lost four aircraft during the first week of October, one from each squadron. The 435 TFS lost F-4D 66-7564 (177 hours), call sign Spitfire, on a 1300-hours ROLLING THUNDER 57 CAP mission over the Cao Bang Highway Bridge in RP-VIB. At 20°-20’N/105°-15’E the aircraft was hit in the left engine by a MiG AAM. MAJ J.D. Moore, pilot/1LT S.B. Gulbrandson, WSO, turned for home base before the fire damage forced them to eject at 21°-02’N/104°-00’E, riding the rest of the way home aboard a USAF helicopter. On 6 October the 433 TFS lost F-4C 63-7612 (1,183 hours) to the loss of power during take-off. The aircrew, probably 1LT J.L. Fuller and 1LT J.E. Nicholson, wee recovered. On 7 October the 555 TFS lost F-4D 65-0727 (397 hours), call sign Falcon, on a 1300-hours ROLLING THUNDER 57 Photo Escort mission over RP-VIA. In level flight enroute to the target the aircraft was hit in the left engine by a SAM at 21°-09’N/105°-51’E, with a resulting fire. A McAir document lists the loss due to a MiG-21 during a CAP mission. CAPT William R. Austin, II, was captured. MAJ Ivan D. Appleby (9/9/67 ejection) is listed as KIA, his remains were repatriated on 13 February 1995. The fourth loss occurred on 8 October—F-4C 63-7645 (1,017), 433 TFS, was involved in a mid-air collision over Thailand. Following a CAP mission the aircraft collided during the approach to Ubon RTAFB. The F-4C went down immediately due to major stabilator damage. The aircrew, probably CAPT D.R. Calvert and LT J.V. Macnab, were safely recovered.

NVAF Airfield Campaign

USAF and CTF-77 were finally authorized to strike the Phuc Yen AF (JCS Target No. 6.00), located north-west of Hanoi, and the Cat Bi AF, located just south of Haiphong (struck for the first time back on 8 October). Three days of concentrated strikes began on 24 October.

The 4 TFS/33 TFW, Eglin AFB, Florida, had just handed over a complement of new production F-4D to the 433 TFS/8 TFW—completing the conversion effective 24 October. To celebrate this conversion the squadron added one red star this same day to their MiG tally board when MAJ William L. Kirk, pilot/1LT Theodore E. Bongartz, WSO, in F-4D 66-7750, used the AIM-7 Sparrow III to knock down a MiG-21. The 8 TFW was now a four-squadron F-4 Wing with 80 F-4D based at Ubon RTAFB.

Four MiGs fell to U.S. air forces on 26 October. The 555 TFS scored all three MiG-17 kills this day. CAPT John D. Logeman, Jr., pilot/1LT Fredric E. McCoy7, III, WSO, in F-4D 66-0274, call sign Ford 01; CAPT William S. Gordon, III, pilot/1LT James H. Monsees, WSO, in F-4D 66-7546, each used the AIM-7E Sparrow III AAM to down their MiF-17s. CAPT Larry D. Cobb, pilot/CAPT Allen A. Lavoy, WSO, in F-4D 66-7565, used the maligned AIM-4D Falcon AAM to score its first MiG kill.

During the three-day campaign, 24-26 October, the U.S. air forces destroyed twenty MiGs on the ground and four more in the air, essentially wiping out the attrition replacements from the May-June MiG killing spree. As a result, the NVAF once again fled to the sanctuary bases in southern China.

On 27 October the 435 TFS lost F-4D 66-7513 (276 hours), call sign Ford, during an 0800-hours ROLLING THUNDER 57 CAP mission over the Hanoi Railroad and Highway Bridge. Jinking on station (21°-31’N/105°-36’E) the aircraft was hi in the left engine by 37/57-mm AAA, with a resulting fire. 1LT Lorenzo Conner is listed as Crash-KIA. CAPT J.B. Black was captured—however, his stay in a North Vietnam POW was a short one as he was released from captivity on 16 February 1968.

F-4D Deliveries

All of the factory fresh F-4D acquired in October were routed from the factory to the Ogden depot before being handed over to the 8 TFW aircrews for the ferry to Ubon RTAFB. Other sources cite the transfers were made by the 4 TFS/33 TFW with the 433 TFS completing the transition to the F-4D effective 24 October. The transfer dates from the Ogden AMA depot are listed below.

1/10: 66-7681 20/10: 66-8728

2/10: 66-7728, 66-7765, 66-7750 24/10: 66-7766, 66-7767, 66-8717,

3/10: 66-7763, 66-7761 66-8687, 66-8694, 66-8724,

4/10: 66-7756 30/10: 66-8687, 66-8694, 66-8724,

10/10: 66-8688, 66-8708 66-8725

11/10: 66-8697 31/10: 66-7771

12/10: 66-8690, 66-8692, 66-8720

17/10: 66-7769, 66-8685, 66-8686,

66-8691

On 24 October the aircrew in F-4C 63-7601 received a sudden change in mission when the front canopy separated from the aircraft during take-off.

F-4D 66-7703 and 66-7704 wee transferred on 31 October from the 33 TFW.

During October the Wing introduced the Maintenance Awards Program as an in-house means of measuring maintenance reliability of aircraft. The ‘attaboy’ program involved weekly posting of crew chiefs being recognized as the Outstanding Mechanic/Crew Chief/Loan Crew, Wing Maintenance Man of the Month/ Crew Chief of the Month, Safety Standing, Dock Crew of the Month, and Top ‘12’ Sorties without deviations. A bit of humor related to the maintenance program had to do with the down side-as opposed to honoring outstanding personnel the Wing had ‘Pig Alley’ for those aircraft suffering three or more MDV/Aborts per month.

F-4C 63-7432 was attending the 6400 TS COMBAT SAGE program, 3-12 November.

On 6 November the 435 TFS celebrated a double MiG-17 kill. CAPT Darrell D. Simmonds, pilot/1LT George H. McKinney, Jr., PSO, in F-4D 66-7601, masterfully proved the combat value of the SUU-23-mm centerline gun pod in shooting down two Mig-17 Frescos.

On 8 November the 555 TFS lost F-4D 66-0250 (490 hours), call sign Olds, during a 0700-hours ROLLING TUNDER 57 MIGCAP mission over North Vietnam. Enroute to the target area the aircraft was caught unawares by a MiG-fired AAM (probably MiG-21) at 22°-00’N/104°-33’E, RP-V. Hit in the tail with an ensuing fire he aircrew ejected at 21°20’N/104°-21’E: MAJ W.S. Gordon was recovered by USAF CSAR helicopter; 1LT R.C. Brenneman was captured.

Another thirteen F-4C were transferred to the 366 TFW during November:

3/11: 63-7413
15/11: 63-7432

13/11: 63-7441, 63-7552, 63-7580,
19/11: 63-7658

63-7582, 63-7594, 63-7601 27/11: 63-7524, 63-7684, 63-7693, 63-7708

F-4C 63-7586 was transferred on 7 November to the 12 TFW.

F-4C 64-0724 was inducted on 10 November into the SMAMA logistics unit.

A pair of F-4D visited the 6400 TS COMBAT SAGE unit twice during the month: 66-7756 visited 14-15 November and 25 November through 1 December; 66-7506 visited 24-27 November and 29 November through 1 December.

F-4D acquisitions during November involved a split program. The 33 TFW transferred six F-4D to the Ogden AMA depot from where they were transferred on7 November to the 8 TFW: 66-7682, 66-8696, 66-8736, 66-8739, 66-8746. Another six F-4D were transferred from the Ogden AMA depot on 14 November: 66-7721, 66-7757, 66-7774, 66-8693, 66-8695, and 66-8729.

The 8 TFW was subsequently involved in ferrying a number of F-4D from the Continental U.S. to the theater then on to the 523 TFS/405 Fighter Wing at Clark AB: six F-4D were picked up from the Ogden AMA depot on 20 November: 66-7666, 66-7683, 66-8743 (-30/11), 66-8737, 66-8740, and were transferred to the 405 FW on 25 November. Another six aircraft were picked on 28 November and transferred to the 405 FW on 3 December: 66-7683, 66-7691, 66-7697, 66-8756, 66-8760, and 66-8742.

Rear Seat Manning

With the introduction of the F-4D into the USAF fleet there was considerable discussion regarding the aircrew composition in the F-4D. Among the major factors considered was the shortage of pilots (combination of introducing a two-seat aircraft which doubled USAF’s requirement for pilots, and the heavy combat attrition rate) and the need for specialized radar training in the F-4D. The USAF Air Staff favored a mix of 70% pilots/30% navigators in the rear seat and steps were taken to establish this ratio in all F-4 and General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark squadrons. The USAF Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nevada, initiated a three-month course in specialized rear seat radar training. The 8 TFW received their first navigator-bombardiers in November. This likewise involved a slow transition from the Pilot Systems Operator (PSO) to the Weapons System Operator (WSO) in the rear seat. Soon thereafter the assigned squadrons received up to five WSOs assigned.

In a letter dated 21 November the Wing Commanders for the 8 TFW, 12 TFW, 366 TFW were ordered to ensure that a local F-4 pilot upgrading training program was established to upgrade highly qualified/experienced F-4 pilots to Aircraft Commander status as rapidly as combat commitments and the local environment permitted. The stated goal was to upgrade three pilots per month (per Wing). The pilots were to be upgraded in accordance with AFR 51-34 as amended and supplemented. Waivers were applicable as stated:

    a. In-flight refueling requirement for units whose mission does not require IFR.
    b. Nuclear weapon delivery.
    c. Instrument portion not compatible with base facilities, i.e., UHF/DF and ADF penetration and/or approach.
    d. Formation take-off and landing when runway is less than 125-ft. wide.
    e. Conventional weapon scores. To satisfy this requirement a minimum of three missions per event will be flown with an IP on regularly fragged combat sorties for those units with a strike mission. Sorties to satisfy this qualification criteria will be flown in relatively low threat areas."

To address this requirement the 12 TFW established a program that was similarly utilized by the other two Wings:

Theater Indoctrination and Checkout Program

The checkout program for newly assigned F-4C aircrews included being assigned an escort to ensure that all personal equipment is fitted and ready for flight. Squadron supervisory personnel closely monitored all checkouts to ensure Wing and Squadron procedures were met. The Instructor Pilots (IP) were well qualified and emphasized tactics, safety and standardization on every flight. New aircrewmen were thoroughly indoctrinated on aircraft pre-flight and ordnance delivery techniques of all weapons in the Wing inventory. After being cleared by the Standards/Evaluation (STAN/EVAL) section the newly arrived Aircraft Commanders were teamed with experienced pilots.

Proficiency Checks

Changes in Flight Lead (pilot) and Aircraft Commander (PSO, aka, backseater) positions were implemented in mid-1967. All Flight Leads were given Flight Lead Checks and all new Aircraft Commanders were given proficiency checks. When an Aircraft Commander had completed a minimum of 40 combat missions (20-30 missions in special areas to be individually approved by the Wing DCO) and was considered ready for upgrading to Flight Lead he was scheduled for practice Flight Lead sorties. When he had flown combat missions in all CORPS, TIGER HOUND and TALLY HO areas, the upgrading Aircraft Commander would be given a Flight Lead Check by a member of the Wing STAN/EVAL section. An oral evaluation would also be conducted to ensure competent knowledge of operational procedures. In December the 12 TFW initiated a program to upgrade the backseaters (Aircraft Commander) to the front seat position. In part this was an effort to upgrade the morale of the backseater cadre.

December

F-4D 65-0725 was transferred on 1 December to the Ogden depot.

Three F-4C were transferred on 2 December to the 12 TFW: 63-7556, 64-0704, and 64-0779. At the end of December the 8 TFW had only two F-4C left.

Two F-4D made a pair of visits to the 6400 TS COMBAT SAGs program during the month: 66-7506, 8-12 December and 13-22 December; 66-7682, 9-12 December and 14-19 December.

F-4D 66-8691 was inducted on 15 December into the SMAMA Ubon unit.

On 16 December the 555 TFS lost F-4D 66-7631 (286 hours), call sign Olds, during a 1000-hours ROLLING THUNDER 57 CAP mission over RP-VIS. On station (21°-12’N/106°-20’E) the aircraft was hit in the aft fuselage by a RAM (probably MiG-21). The aircrew ejected at 21°-20'N/106°-08 'E and were captured. MAJ J.F. Low’s stay was short lived, being released from captivity on 2 August 1968. 1LT H.J. Hill, PSO, served out the duration as a POW.

17 December

The Paul Donner and Canal Des Rapides crossings the Red River flowing through Hanoi were hit again on 17 December. Too, the Lang Lau Railroad Bridge in RP-VIA was hit. The 497 TFS/8 TFW lost two F-4D on 17 December, F-4D 66-7772 (21 hours), call sign Hornet, was on a 1500-hours ROLLING THUNDER 57 CAP mission over RP-V when hit in the fuselage by a MiG gun (probably MiG-17) at 21°-40'N/105°-10'E. MAJ K.R. Flesnor, pilot/1LT T.L. Boyes, PSO, ejected at 21°-23'N/105°-15'E and were quickly captured. Later that night F-4D 66-7757, (70 hours) call sign Rocket, was on a midnight hour ROLLING THUNDER 57 strike on the Hau Hung Ferry in RP-I (17°-24'N/106°-39'E). MAJ J.L. Suttersen, pilot/1LT S.P. Sox, P)SO, ejected at sea (17°-30'N/106°N/48'E) and were recovered by USN CSAR helicopter.

On 19 December 1LT George H. McKinney, Jr., a PSO with the 435 TFS, added his third SUU-23 MiG kill—actually, only half a kill. MAJ Joseph D. Moore, pilot/1LT McKinney, Jr., PSO, in F-4D 66-7601, call sign Nash 01, snared a MiG-17 kill with MAJ William M. Dalton, pilot/MAJ James L. Braham, PSO, in F-105F 63-8329, 333 TFS/355 TFW. The F-105F ___________20-mm internal cannon and the F-4D SUU-23 20-mm external gun pod were effective in downing the MiG-17.

A change in strategy during the 1967 dry seasons the Pathet Lao insurgents and NVA in Laos began building all-weather roads. The importance of this change was to allow the Pathet Lao forces to pursue un-obstructed warfare against the Royal Lao Army and to give the NVA-VC better Ho Chi Mian Trail conditions. The effectiveness of the change was soon to be felt as the Pathet Lao surprised and defeated the Royal Lao Army units defending Luang Prabang in the north and besieging two more provincial capitals in the Laotian panhandle. To defend themselves the Royal Lao Army and GEN Pao’s Mao Army turned more and more to increasing U.S. air power. Lessons here were soon to be relearned—that territory won in the air cannot be held without troops on the ground. The Pathet Lao/NVA captured the TACAN station at Lima Site 61 in southern Laos. In response to these attcks on the TACAN sites the Seventh Air Force launched 128 sorties in support of the crucial TACAN facility at Lima Site 85 during December.

Like in November the F-4D acquisitions during December involved picking up their own aircraft as well as ferrying aircraft in for the 405 FW. From the Ogden AMA depot: 66-777- on 5 December (8 TFW 5-10/12; 405 FW 10-18/12; 8 TFW 18/12-); 66-7655, 66-7758, 66-8743, 66-8786 on 12 December; (66-8769 was picked up for the 366 TFW, temporarily assigned to the 8 TFW during the transpac, 12-22/12; same for 66-7729, temporarily assigned to the 8 TFW, 21-26/12); 66-8785 on 19 December; 66-8763 on 29 December. Aircraft picked up on 5 December for the 405 FW: 66-7520, 66-7672, 66-7673 and 66-8747, all of which were turned over to the 523 TFS by 20 December.

On 28 December the 435 TFS lost F-4D 66-7521 (341 hours), call sign Advanc 1, during a 1900-hours Strike on nine trucks along Route 911, Section E, STEEL TIGER, Laos. During a dive on the target (17°-22'N/105°-42'E) the aircraft was hit by 37-mm AAA with ensuing fire. CAPT R.W. Coburn, pilot/CAPT H. Altman, PSO, were safely recovered.

Tailcodes added during the years: the 433 TFS added ‘FG’; 435 TFS added ‘FO’; 497 TFS added ‘FP’; and the 555 added ‘FY’.

8 TFW Tactics

In a letter drafted by COL Virgil K. Meroney, 8 TFW Deputy Commander for Operations, the following tactics were being passed on for ________________in South Vietnam.

1. All in-country strikes will be under the control of a FAC or Skyspot agency. When reporting in for in-country operations, report to Panama or handoff

to the next control agency. It is not necessary, nor desired, to through any ABCCC when you are fragged into South Vietnam. Panama will pass the flight to the area DASC, identified by location name, i.e., Long Ha DASC or the Corps number, i.e., I (Eye) V (Vee) or II (II) DASC. The DASC will instruct the flight to contact a FAC on a specific frequency. These frequencies may be passed in the clear or by color code. (Color coded frequencies are not yet available to the 8 TFW). Be patient when attempting contact with the FAC as he is monitoring three radios and in fact may not be on the assigned frequency until your TOT.

2. When egressing the target area, use extreme caution when selecting as departure heading so as to avoid artillery firing areas. The FAC may be of assistance in this matter, but usually Panama has the latest information. Artillery can go as high as 32,000 feet.

3. Previous instructions on use of dive/toss and direct mode for bomb release

applies . Dive/Toss mode, when operating properly, improves accuracy over direct release; however, by delaying pickle until a slightly lower altitude, i.e., 5000 feet for 40° dive, as an example. Accuracy should be further ___________and reduce any gross error that might result from a malfunction.

4. High drag weapons delivery requires that special attention be paid to avoidance of frag patterns. To accurately deliver high drag weapons it is necessary to release at considerably lower altitudes than we are used to. Generally a 4 or 5 "G" pull-up and turn away from the frag pattern is adequate. Escape from any frag pattern is predicated on the release altitude, ________safe altitude for the ordnance dropped, and proper and immediate recovery maneuver. Additionally, sufficient separation between aircraft, usually 20 to 30 seconds, is required to assure that the debris has fallen back to earth before the next pass on the same target is initiated.
5. Should guns be carried on a CAS mission, reserve some ammo at the end of the strike to provide flax suppression for the FAC while he makes a BDA check.